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This article provides a rounded critique of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs): a newly 
developed and innovative financial investment model, developed in the UK and starting 
to spread internationally that could transform the provision of social services. Although 
SIBs have the potential to influence delivery by all providers, this article raises three 
concerns about their possible effects - in relation to their potential outcomes, 
unintended consequences for the UK third sector, and governance - and then reflects 
upon SIBs as the latest manifestation of the ideological shift which the UK third sector is 
undergoing.   
 







In the UK, the financial crisis of 2008 has led to policies of reduced public spending 
associated with deficit and debt reduction (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011). This has 
been accompanied by demand for more ‘efficient’ use of scarce public resources and an 
acceleration of previous policies regarding outsourcing funding for, and provision of, 
social services. Third sector organisations have been identified, along with conventional 
private sector companies as potential outsourcing routes, on the assumption that they 
are capable of being more innovative and responsive than their public sector 
counterparts (Allen, 2009; Millar, 2012).   
However, if the provision of social services is to be transformed in this way, it is 
considered that alternative forms and sources of finance have to be found or created. 
One such newly developed and innovative financial investment model, Social Impact 
Bonds (SIBs), will be critiqued here.  
SIBs represent a departure from traditional financing routes for third sector 
organisations and public services delivery. SIBs are a form of Payment by Results (PbR) 
but extend this by harnessing social investment from capital markets to meet needs 
arising from budget cuts (Social Investment Task Force, 2010).    
The term “social investment” in this context refers to a monetary investment in a social 
policy initiative, providing the investor with a financial return while delivering public 
welfare services (Kingston and Bolton, 2004; Mulgan et al., 2010). The social investment 
market in the UK was estimated to be worth £190 million in 2010 (Cabinet Office, 
2011), although it is gathering momentum and political support, as illustrated by the 
establishment of a social investment bank in the UK, Big Society Capital (BSC)1. BSC is an 
independent financial institution funded through an investment of £50 million from 
each of the four Merlin Banks - Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of 
Scotland - and the Dormant Accounts Scheme2. It aims to utilise finance from capital 
markets for social purposes and transform the social sector in the process (Cohen, 
                                                          
1
 BSC was originally to be called Big Society Bank (BSB) (Cabinet Office 2010). 
2 The Scheme, introduced following the establishment of The Dormant Bank and Building Society 
Accounts Act 2008, enables unclaimed balances of money held in accounts for 15 years or more to be 
reinvested for the benefit of the community. An agreement has been made to transfer a portion of these 
unclaimed accounts to BSC (Big Society Capital, 2012a). During 2012 capital received by BSC from the 





2012). BSC does not invest directly in third sector organisations but instead invests in 
social investment finance intermediaries, such as Social Finance, which developed SIBs.  
Advocates of SIBs present them as a ‘win-win’ option for all involved. The UK Minister 
for Civil Society, Nick Hurd, described them as “opening up serious resources to tackle 
social problems in new and innovative ways”, and argued that they generate new 
investment in social policies at no cost and minimal risk to public finances (quoted in 
Wintour, 2012).  However the enthusiasm with which SIBs have been embraced has not 
always been tempered by a rounded critique. Though SIBs will have the potential to 
influence delivery by all providers, this article will raise three concerns about their 
possible effects - in relation to their potential outcomes, unintended consequences for 
the UK third sector, and its governance - and then reflect upon SIBs as a manifestation of 
the latest ideological shift to impact upon the UK third sector. Firstly, however, we 
consider the reasons behind the eagerness that has greeted this development. 
 
Social Impact Bonds 
PbR arrangements have been embraced by successive UK Governments to finance 
health and welfare services. They permit the Government to pay providers of 
outsourced public services in relation to the achievement of measured outcomes, thus 
transferring the financial risk to the provider (Audit Commission, 2012). The world’s 
first SIB was announced by then (Labour) UK Justice Secretary Jack Straw in March 
2010.  It was developed by Social Finance to reduce reoffending rates among short-
sentenced prisoners (those sentenced to less than one year) at Her Majesty’s Prison 
(HMP) Peterborough (Walker, 2010).  
SIBs differ in several important ways from previous PbR models. The term ‘bond’ is in 
itself somewhat misleading. While a traditional financial bond is described in any basic 
corporate finance textbook (Brealey et al., 2001) as a debt security whereupon the bond 
holder receives fixed interest (coupon) payments until maturity (at a fixed point in 
time), SIBs pay out financial returns only when specified social outcomes have been 
met, thus acting more like an equity product (Bolton and Saville, 2010; Greenhalgh, 
2011). They also involve a multi-stakeholder arrangement between the Government, 





intermediary brokers an arrangement whereby an investor can recoup their capital 
investment in a service provider, along with an additional financial return (paid by the 
Government or an organisation on whose behalf the service is being delivered), if the 
service provider achieves specific outcomes for a target population (Bolton and Saville, 
2010). The rate of financial return can vary in relation to the social outcomes attained, 
with an agreed base level below which investors forsake their investment and receive 
no additional returns. For example, an investor will receive a financial return of 2.5% if 
there is a 7.5% reduction in re-offending, when measured against a matched control 
group; higher reduction rates in re-offending will generate higher financial returns, to a 
maximum of 13.3%; and reduction rates of less than 7.5% will cause investors to lose 
their capital (Cohen, 2012).     
The investor’s recapitalisation and receipt of additional returns is paid from savings 
which accrue from any improved service outcomes. The intention is that the 
Government ensures that social services are still provided while the risk of financing 
these is borne by investors rather than service providers, as in other PbR arrangements. 
Service providers do not have to ‘front’ the capital for service delivery (Disley et al., 
2011) as this can be thought of as being ‘forward funded’ by the investors (Scott, 2012), 
and investors have the opportunity to gain a financial return from an investment which 
has a social mission (Bolton and Saville, 2010). 
There is an international push to embed this embryonic funding device across a range of 
welfare and public services, with further SIBs at various stages of development and 
implementation in the UK3, the USA and Australia (Robinson, 2012). Advocates hope 
that this new model of finance will stimulate creative partnerships for financing and 
delivering social services, particularly in a time of restricted and uncertain public 
budgets (Bolton and Saville, 2010; Social Investment Task Force, 2010).  
 
Outcomes 
The viability of SIBs relies upon the measurement of social outcomes. In principle, a 
shift from the somewhat blunt instrument of target driven outputs to outcomes is 
                                                          
3 The first SIB in Scotland has been created for a project aimed at supporting young people by Perth YMCA 






welcome. However, social outcomes are notoriously difficult to measure. Assessing how 
and the extent to which an intervention impacts on, for example, a participant’s well-
being is not a simple task: these types of outcome tend to be continuous rather than 
categorical. ‘Off the shelf’ measures do not exist for many of the social outcomes which 
SIBs aim to effect and proxies or new indicators would have to be used. While an 
indication of a service’s effect may be adequate for some evaluations it is insufficient for 
the contracting arrangements involved in PbR and SIBs, as the payment of financial 
returns is conditional upon outcomes, and precision is required to avoid disputes.  
The complexity involved in formulating a SIB contract based on impact is further 
evident due to the problem SIBs raise of how to document the programme mechanism 
which generates any impacts. This reflects difficulties of attribution of changes in 
outcomes to specific policy actions as articulated by Pawson et al. (2004) and in 
literature on Social Return on Investment (SROI) (Arvidson et al., 2013). SIBs risk 
encouraging an emphasis on a simplistic ‘mechanical’ model of cause and effect, resting 
on the notion that an intervention is a singular ‘thing’ or event which results in a clearly 
discernible outcome. This fails to grasp the complexity of the conditions and contexts of 
the social problems that SIBs are aimed at addressing. For example, while recidivism 
appears to be an outcome more suitable than others for a SIB, reducing recidivism 
requires liaising with (and perhaps changes in the practices of) several agencies 
involved in providing and supporting the target client group including housing, social 
security benefits, and employment training; impact is also shaped by the nature of the 
local employment market. It is possible – in fact common – for a promising social project 
to be ‘let down’ by failings in another part of the support system that the target group 
need if they are to have a reasonable prospect of improving their situation (Pawson, 
2002). The obverse of this is also the case: how can an outcome be attributed to an 
intervention per se when its apparent effect might be due to other services or 
favourable conditions? 
The premise of SIBs fails to understand that social inclusion policies are not mechanical 
levers but much more organic processes, and entail the reconfiguration of complex 







Unintended Consequences for the UK Third Sector 
Unintended consequences in the form of distorted activity within the third sector can 
result from perverse incentives which lead third sector entities away from activities 
that are most needed towards activities that are most measurable. As discovered with 
outcome-based contracting of provider-led pathways to work, PbR can create incentives 
for organisations to shape their provision around the terms of the contract rather than 
the needs of clients (Hudson et al., 2010). Consequently, those most vulnerable and in 
greatest need may be ‘parked’ and neglected due to the difficulty, cost and time involved 
in dealing with them satisfactorily, while operations are focused instead on ‘creaming’ 
clients with less need, but who are easier to remove from claimant counts, thereby 
fulfilling incentivised or contractual outcomes.  
Distortion of activity through PbR can also manifest in other ways. For instance, in the 
appropriation of social enterprises, which have been widely championed as prime 
candidates in the third sector to fill gaps in the provision of public services as the state 
retreats (Brady, 2011). Whilst there remains no legal definition of a social enterprise in 
the UK, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) definition often continues to be 
cited; “a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally 
reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than being 
driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners” (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2002, p13). Despite this the lack of a legal definition leaves the 
nature of what a social enterprise is open to distortion. Several actors in the private and 
public sectors have already taken advantage of this to suit their own agendas (Jones, 
2012; Roy et al., 2013), particularly the UK Government in the context of discussions of 
social enterprise involvement in NHS reform (Hampson, 2010). This ambiguity opens 
the way to further creative interpretation, as private, for-profit enterprises may be 
sought to provide services under the guise of ‘social enterprises’ as a smokescreen for 
privatisation. Any such extension of how social enterprise is conceptualised in the UK 
would certainly represent a further shift away from the western European tradition, to 
which the DTI definition broadly adheres, towards more US-oriented traditions of social 
enterprise, which can allow for a (mostly) unfettered profit-making business, with 





The risk of mission-drift (or shift) is heightened by a distinct lack of ‘social investment 
readiness’; this is not confined to social enterprises but to the entire third sector 
(Gregory et al., 2012). Arguably, the current lack of investment readiness is in great part 
attributable to the fact that the majority of social enterprises are simply far too small for 
SIBs to be relevant to them. The bulk of public service contracts are awarded to large 
multinational outsourcing corporations (such as Atos, A4E and Serco) which have the 
working capital to manage the significant cashflow pressures until PbR contracts meet 
their payment trigger points (Social Enterprise UK, 2012). Social Enterprise UK has 
described this emerging private sector oligopoly, where a small number of companies 
have a large share of the public services market, as the “Shadow State” (Social 
Enterprise UK, 2012).  
To compete with such corporations and become more suitable for SIB financing, social 
enterprises may well feel under pressure to grow substantially or to amalgamate. But 
social enterprises are often created to address a specific local need, and pressure to 
‘achieve scale’ may well have the consequence of leaving their communities and original 
purposes behind. Any such mission drift will have adverse consequences for those most 
vulnerable who need local, and specifically tailored support. 
 
Governance 
Previous PbR arrangements generally preserved the Government’s control over the 
selection of service providers. However, the commissioning process involved in 
arranging a SIB dissipates Government responsibility, as an intermediary that facilitates 
the SIB, such as Social Finance, commissions the service provider (Disley et al., 2011). 
SIBs therefore involve the Government not only outsourcing the services which tackle 
social problems but also the responsibility for selecting a provider, thereby eroding the 
trail of public and democratic accountability. The loss of a direct relationship between 
service provider and Government will enhance the build-up of asymmetric information 
in favour of the provider, and could reduce oversight and the ability of Government to 
influence provision or step-in if malpractice occurs. In light of the investigations into 
potential fraud at A4e, a major contractor for the Work Programme, the Commons 
Public Accounts Committee (2012) recommended that the Department for Work and 





selected to provide public services. SIBs compromise the ability of Government to 
implement these recommendations as they involve outsourcing commissioning of 
public services. 
The infrastructure required to create a social stock market4 includes SIB intermediaries 
and a regulating body (Cohen, 2012) to prevent potential collusions between these 
intermediaries and service providers. Central to any such market are assets, and SIBs 
are being billed as a new asset class which can help instil market discipline within the 
social economy (Bolton and Saville, 2010). While the stated intentions of benefiting the 
third sector and continuing to provide essential social services may be genuine, they are 
expressed in the language of markets and private sector business. A programme of 
austerity and retrenchment lends legitimacy to the argument for more innovation, and 
the discourse of markets and business has been championed in these circumstances 
(Seelos and Mair, 2012). There is a danger that the untempered adoption of this ethos 
and language may dilute the underlying principles of the third sector and what arguably 
makes it distinctive – the relationships with communities, underlying values and 
commitment to social justice and transformative social change – which, although 
contested (Macmillan, 2013), may be lost (McCabe, 2012).   
This market-oriented discourse also leads to a moral question about what role the 
market should play in society in relation to social problems. Private companies already 
play a role in various social sectors, such as in the provision of health care and the penal 
system, through privately run prisons (one of which is HMP Peterborough). However, 
there is a risk that further encroachment of the private sector into funding and 
evaluating the performance of third sector service providers, promoted by SIBs-type 
funding arrangements, could reduce their autonomy and independence. Thus SIBs could 
further erode the boundaries between the private, public and third sectors and expose 
public policy provision even more widely to the vagaries of the market.     
There is also the potential for and interest in further market developments in the social 
economy; for instance the development of a secondary market for social investments 
through which investors could sell on their initial investment (Disley et al., 2011). These 
current and future developments could be framed as investors praying on the 
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vulnerabilities of others for their own financial gain (Scott, 2012) and advocates have 
been anxious to dismiss the notion that SIBs are simply a “money making wheeze” 
(Travis, 2010). However, precedent from the derivatives market and its central role in 
the recent financial crisis (Acharya et al., 2009) leads to real concerns around the re-
sale and re-packaging of assets furthering detachment between ownership and 
responsibility and a resulting deterioration of accountability, pricing and governance.  
 
Social Impact Bonds, the UK Third Sector and an Ideological Shift   
SIBs are being introduced in the UK at a time when third sector organisations face 
unprecedented cuts and fundamental financial restructuring. It has been estimated that 
that voluntary and community organisations in the UK will lose around £911 million in 
public funding per year by 2015/16, and that the cumulative reductions in resources 
amount to £2.8 billion over the period from 2011-2016 (Davison, 2013). This is 
occurring while some local authorities face losing one third of their revenue by 
2017/18. Furthermore, an increasing proportion of public support provided to third 
sector organisations will be provided by loan and service payments rather than by 
grants and subsidies (Davison and Heap, 2013). 
However, economic austerity is only one aspect of the context in which SIBs are being 
developed in the UK; the other is a distinctive political and ideological climate. SIBs are 
in large measure motivated not just by current economic exigencies but an acceleration 
of a policy trend promoted by successive UK governments for over a decade. There is 
little reference to economic difficulties in the Cabinet Office White Paper (2013, p17) 
Growing the Social Investment Market; instead this focuses on a promoting a ”new pillar 
of finance” to deliver public services. This emphasis reflects the ambition of the Social 
Investment Task Force to encourage private sector financing of the third sector which 
was articulated in its first report, Enterprising Communities: Wealth Beyond Welfare in 
October 2000 under the previous (Labour) Government. This report recommended 
setting up Social Investment intermediaries to assume a greater role in funding third 
sector activity (Social Investment Task Force, 2000). 
SIBs therefore merely represent the continuation of a trend by successive UK 





encouraging increased investment from private sector financial and other 
intermediaries and ‘marketising’ the third sector. For example, Sir Ronald Cohen, the 
Chair of BSC5 stated that its mission is to “grow the market in social investment by 
tapping into the vast wealth of capital markets” (SENSCOT, 2012). The ‘new paradigm’ 
promoted by the BSC is for the UK social sector to become an ‘asset class’ worthy of city 
investment by being able to pay dividends to investors; to achieve this, third sector 
organisations will be expected to adopt more private sector norms and practices. This is 
not only a UK trend but observable in development work internationally, where the role 
of grant-funding is being challenged and increasing emphasis is being placed on “impact 
investing, and its seductive message of doing good and making money” (Hattendorf, 
2012). 
SIBs are therefore the latest stage in an ideological shift which favours removing 
delivery of social and welfare services from conventional public or third sector 
providers, and they mark a significant challenge to the traditional ethos and operation 
of the voluntary and community sector. The relatively favourable reception accorded 
SIBs by sections of the third sector has led some commentators to claim that there are 
influential elements in the UK third sector which appear to endorse further 
privatisation measures in welfare reform (Mair, 2012). This is perhaps unsurprising in 
view of the increasing prominence of those from a social enterprise or private sector 
background in the UK third sector who may be more favourably disposed towards 
commercial financial sources and operating models (Davison, 2013).  
However, while the UK government’s enthusiasm for SIBs have been echoed by sections 
of the third sector in England, there has been a distinctly more lukewarm reception to 
them in Scotland, where only one SIB currently operates. While the Scottish Council for 
Voluntary Organisations has supported the development of SIBs (SCVO, 2011), the 
Scottish Government and most other sections of the third sector in Scotland have 
resisted them. For example, SENSCOT (the Social Entrepreneurs Network for Scotland) 
has argued that the funding and operation model proposed by BSC and represented by 
SIBs is “fundamentally flawed and could potentially harm the third sector” and has 
argued that there is a “radical incompatibility” between the values of the private and the 
third sector (SENSCOT, 2012). Consistent with the trend for ever widening policy 
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 It has been announced that Sir Ronald Cohen will be stepping down from his role as the Chair of BSC but will 





divergence between London and Edinburgh, the Scottish Government has resisted 
impact measurement and PbR in public services, and preferred alternative funding and 
delivery mechanisms to SIBs, such as Public Social Partnerships (PSPs) (Scottish 
Government, 2011a) and initiatives known as ‘Change Funds’, including one to reduce 
reoffending (Scottish Government, 2011b). However, these alternatives are transitional 
support mechanisms rather than permanent solutions, and may not be sustainable in 
view of severe cuts in funding for the foreseeable future. 
 
Conclusion 
The financial crisis has created fertile soil for new, innovative funding mechanisms and 
delivery agreements for social services. A willingness to embrace innovation is most 
apparent in the field of so-called ‘social investment’. SIBs have emerged as one 
instrument combining PbR and social investment that has garnered support, notably 
among former investment bankers seeking to bring their experience in harnessing 
finance from the capital markets to the third sector (Social Finance, 2012).  
However, support for this nascent area should be tempered by critique and an evidence 
base that informs policy development. Whilst this review piece has sought to offer the 
former, there is a clear need for further research which will expound upon the 
implications and outcomes, both negative and positive, of embracing this burgeoning 
funding approach. Comparative work particularly around parallel SIB developments in 
other countries, such as the provision of therapeutic services to inmates in Rikers 
Island, USA (Olson and Phillips, 2012), the trials of Social Benefit Bonds in New South 
Wales, Australia (Centre for Social Impact, 2012) and even in Scotland, where the sole 
SIB has adopted “a more localised community model” (SENSCOT, 2013) in an attempt to 
foster the relationships of those parties involved and engage investors in the local need 
of the project, is required. Further analysis of the HMP Peterborough SIB which so far 
suggests positive signs (Pudelek, 2013) will also shed light on how this field will 
develop.  
It may well be that SIBs bring new and additional resources to finance social and 
welfare services, and may be welcomed by cash-strapped local authorities struggling 





striking that alternative forms of social investment, such as community banks, 
community shares, Change Funds and PSPs which are less influenced by the models of 
private capital markets, have not received the same level of promotion and financial 
backing as SIBs (Community Shares, 2012; Ainsworth, 2012). The withdrawal of Allia’s 
Future for Children’s Bond due to insufficient interest highlights the potential need for 
the “development of simpler social investment products” (Rotheroe et al., 2013, p26).     
Debates over innovative funding sources should reflect upon citizens’ rights and the 
entitlements which social services deliver, and not merely whether they generate 
additional resources in difficult times. SIBs represent more than a merely technical 
reform in how social services are funded. Their impact will be felt beyond the services 
they finance, and what they imply for the control and accountability of services and the 
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